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 1 
THE ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT PLANNING BILL:  
PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVEMENT1 
 
Kevin Aquilina 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The Environment and Development Planning Bill will codify, with amendments, 
the Environment Protection Act and the Development Planning Act into one 
law. This paper studies this Bill from the perspective of development planning 
legislation. It sets out the contribution this Bill will make to Administrative Law, 
Human Rights Law and the Law of Procedure. In certain respects, the Bill 
introduces novel concepts aimed at strengthening transparency and 
accountability in the workings of the Malta Environment and Planning Authority 
(MEPA). In places, the Bill does not go far in strengthening democracy in the 
development planning process. The paper thus suggests how the Bill can provide 
for a better application of the constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers, 
and for the human right of a fair hearing before an independent and impartial 
tribunal, whilst guaranteeing the institutional autonomy of MEPA from 
governmental interference in policy making and decision making. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper discusses the Environment and Development Planning Bill2 (hereinafter ‘the 
Bill’) from a development planning perspective. It identifies the salient changes being 
proposed by this Bill to development planning law, their impact on Administrative Law 
and consequential implications which such changes pose to other branches of the Law 
such as the Law of Procedure and the Law of Human Rights. It concludes by making 
proposals for improvement in the light of the previous parts of this paper aimed at 
strengthening democracy, providing for a better application of the constitutional doctrine 
of the separation of powers and the human right of a fair hearing before an independent 
and impartial tribunal established by law, and guaranteeing the institutional autonomy of 
the Malta Environment and Planning Authority (hereinafter ‘MEPA’) from governmental 
interference in policy making and decision making. 
 
An Overview of the Legislative Provisions of the Bill 
 
As the Bill is a codification of two extant laws, it is necessary to compare and contrast the 
provisions of the Development Planning Act (hereinafter the ‘DPA’) with the 
development planning provisions of the Bill. 
 
Provisions concerning Development Planning Law 
 
The Definitions 
 
Article 2 of the Bill is the interpretation provision and sets out the definition of the key 
terms used in the Bill. When one compares the DPA with the Bill the following terms in 
the DPA have not been included in the Bill’s interpretation provision: “action plan”, 
“advertisement regulation order”, “building levy”, “conservation order”, “the 
Committee”, “development”, “development brief”, “development plans”, “development 
order”, “the Director of Planning”, “enforcement notice”, “exempt works”, “financial 
year”, “House”, “local plan”, “the Mediator”, “official manual”, “planning policy”, 
“structure plan”, “subject plan”, “tree preservation order”  and “Users’ Committee”. 
 
It is correct for Government to argue that the vast majority of the above expressions in 
the Bill are not actually defined in the interpretation provision but are so defined in the 
text of the provisions of the Bill itself. Therefore there might not be any pressing need to 
provide a cross reference in the interpretation provision itself to the other provisions 
contained in one and the same Bill. However, from the point of view of the reader of the 
Bill, cross references in the interpretation provision to the actual text of the Bill where 
those expressions are defined will assist the reader in finding the exact provision where 
the term is defined. This is important since the Bill is a lengthy one aimed at codifying 
two extant laws into one enactment even if it does not go so far as to propose an 
Environment and Development Planning Code. Such a Code goes beyond the simple 
amalgamation of two extant laws into one Act of Parliament. Such cross references in the 
interpretation provision are like a book index making the reading of the Bill more user 
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friendly especially to the layman who might not possess  the same expertise that a lawyer 
has in navigating through legal documents. In order for the public administration to plead 
ignorantia juris neminem excusat3 against the citizen, the laws have to be written in such 
a way as to make them easy for a layman to find, read and understand them easily. In 
other jurisdictions there are various attempts being made at simplification of the law, to 
quote the European Court of Human Rights, to make it accessible to one and all.4 
 
I do understand also why certain terms such as that of “Audit Officer” has been removed 
altogether from the Bill. In the case of this expression, the Audit Officer will be regulated 
under the Ombudsman Act in terms of a House of Representatives Select Committee 
report5 and Bill No. 48 entitled the Ombudsman (Amendment) Act, 2010.6 
 
Other noteworthy points which should be made with regard to the interpretation provision 
are the following: 
(a) “Agency of Government”7 – this definition needs updating in the light of the 
enactment of the Public Administration Act (Chapter 497 of the Laws of Malta) 8. This 
latter enactment lists Government agencies in its Fourth Schedule. At the time when the 
Development Planning Act was enacted in 1992 by Act No. I of 1992, there was no other 
law in Malta which listed, let alone regulated, Government agencies. Now the situation 
has changed with the Public Administration Act 20099 and, so far as is possible, the same 
terminology throughout the statute book should be given the same meaning so as not to 
confuse the reader.10  
(b) “application”: Whilst in the DPA, “application” was defined as a 
‘development planning application’, in the Bill it is defined as a ‘permission or licence 
application’.  The fact that the term ‘development’ has been removed from qualifying the 
term ‘permission’ now means that the term ‘application’ refers to all types of 
applications, not necessarily only development permission applications as is the position 
in the DPA. Such applications include planning control applications as well as 
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applications relating to environmental matters, amongst others. When used in the context 
of the Bill, especially in the context of Part V, the term as now defined to include non-
development planning applications might not be appropriate within the context of the 
provisions in question. This is because such provisions were originally conceived, 
intended and applied to a development control context not to a development planning 
context (e.g. a planning control application) or to an environmental protection licence 
application context. 
 
(c) “development permission”: Whilst article 2 uses the term “development 
permission” there are references in the Bill to “development permits”. What is the 
difference between these two terms? I understand that both terms are intended to be co-
terminus and that this is a drafting oversight. If this is the case, then the term 
‘development permission’ should continue to be used through the Bill. Otherwise the 
reader might think that both nomenclatures have different meanings when this is not the 
case. 
 
(d) Interestingly enough the definition of “subsidiary plans” has been retained but 
the definition of a “development plan” – which includes subsidiary plans – has been 
removed from the interpretation provision of the Bill. 
 
Provisions concerning Administrative Law 
The Malta Environment and Planning Authority 
 
Clause 6 of the Bill establishes the Malta Environment and Planning Authority (MEPA). 
However the MEPA has already been created by the Development Planning Act. Hence, 
from an Administrative Law viewpoint, it does not make sense to create a second MEPA. 
What the law should say is that the Bill is re-establishing the same MEPA that has existed 
hitherto under the DPA and that the rights and obligations which MEPA had under the 
DPA will continue to subsist in the MEPA established by the Bill. In this respect I have 
in mind the learned judgment delivered by Mr. Justice Giannino Caruana Demajo11 
where he had correctly held that the Planning Authority (as MEPA was then known prior 
to the enactment and entry into force of the Cultural Heritage Act, 2002 (Chapter 445 of 
the Laws of Malta), before the Planning Authority and the Environment Protection 
Department were fused together to form the MEPA) was not the legal successor of the 
Planning Area Permits Board. The judgment was followed by Mr. Justice Carmelo 
Farrugia Sacco in a string of decisions he delivered on the same point when presiding the 
Tribunal for the Investigation of Injustices.12 Now the law should take the opposite view 
stating that the MEPA established under the DPA and the MEPA established under the 
Bill are one and the same organ and that the MEPA as re-founded by the Bill will assume 
all the same rights and duties hitherto enjoyed by the MEPA under the DPA. Interestingly 
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enough on this point, when the Bill in clause 8(2)(a) refers to the competent authority 
performing environment protection duties under the extant Environment Protection Act,13 
it uses the following terminology: “to perform and succeed in the functions of the 
Competent Authority established under the provisions of article 3 of the Development 
Planning Act and article 6 of the Environment Protection Act.” 
  
Could not the same terminology be used in clause 6 both for consistency’s sake and for 
the avoidance of doubt to make it clear that the MEPA being established by the Bill is 
one and the same MEPA established hitherto by the DPA? 
 
MEPA Board Membership 
 
Whilst the numerical membership of the MEPA will not change in terms of the Bill in the 
sense that it will still continue to be composed of between thirteen and fifteen board 
members, the number of public officers who sit on the MEPA has been reduced from 5 to 
3.14 The two Chairpersons of the Environment and Planning Commission (previously 
known as the Development Control Commission under the DPA but now with extended 
environmental functions under Clause 6(3) of the Bill will be ex officio MEPA board 
members. This provision thus gives the impression that there will be only two (not three 
as is currently the position) divisions of the Environment and Planning Commission. 
However, clause 35(1) of the Bill reproduces the current provision of the DPA (article 
13(1)) which empowers the Prime Minister to prescribe by order in the Government 
Gazette the number of divisions of the Commission. This means that, as is the situation to 
date, if there continues to be in terms of the Bill three Environment and Planning 
Commissions, one of the chairmen of this Commission will not be appointed as a MEPA 
board member. In addition, once the Environment and Planning Commission will be 
assigned environmental functions by the Bill, the likelihood is that a fourth division (if 
not more) of the said Commission will need to be established to deal with environmental 
matters. The law is silent as to which criteria will be used to determine whom of the 
Commission Chairmen will be appointed ex officio MEPA board members and whom 
not. Irrespective of this, however, should not all the chairmen of the Commission be 
appointed ex officio MEPA board members instead of only two of them? On the other 
hand, if there is no limit set to the number of ex officio Chairmen to be appointed to the 
Commission, then this may be used as a way to theoretically increase the number of 
Chairmen to exceed the other board members. 
 
Conflict of Interest 
 
An innovative provision in the Bill concerns the regulation of conflict of interest of 
MEPA board members Although clause 16 of the Bill and paragraph 6 of the First 
Schedule to the Bill have a provision regulating conflict of interest, clause 6(6)(e) of the 
Bill subjects such conflict to Ministerial review. In fact, clause 6(6)(e) provides that a 
MEPA board member (this terminology includes also the Chairman and Deputy 
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Chairman) may not remain in office if he or she “has a financial or other interest in any 
enterprise or activity which is likely to affect the discharge of his functions as a member 
of the Authority”. The Minister may, nevertheless, “determine that the person’s interest is 
not likely to affect the discharge of his functions and upon such determination that person 
shall be qualified to hold the office of member of the Authority provided that the declared 
interest and the Minister’s determination are published in the Gazette”. 
 
Although an attempt is being made to introduce more transparency and accountability in 
MEPA’s operations and to curtail conflict of interest by not leaving it up to the person 
concerned to determine whether s/he has a conflict of interest thereby embarrassing the 
competent Minister in certain situations bearing in mind the doctrine of individual 
ministerial responsibility, the solution being adopted by the Bill to do away with such 
conflict leaves this decision within the competence of the executive branch of the state. I 
think that it should not be the competent Minister nor the Cabinet of Ministers who 
should decide this matter but an independent authority which has no real or apparent 
interest in the matter. This could be the Commission for the Administration of Justice or 
the Court of Appeal. Another option could be to entrust the Standing Committee on 
Development Planning with the determination of such disputes even if this might have its 
drawbacks in a two party system as in the Malta due to the potential politicization of the 
whole issue on party political grounds. 
 
 
Other categories of persons excluded from MEPA Board Membership 
 
Other categories of persons who have been included in the Bill that cannot be appointed 
MEPA board members are: 
 
(a) a Minister; 
(b) a Parliamentary Secretary; 
(c) a Member of the European Parliament; 
(d) a judge or magistrate of the courts of justice; 
(e) interdicted or incapacitated persons; 
(f) persons convicted of an offence affecting public trust, or theft, or fraud, or of 
knowingly receiving property obtained by theft or fraud, or of bribery, or of 
money laundering;  
(g) persons subject to a disqualification under article 320 of the Companies Act. 
 
 
Interestingly enough no prohibition is made as to the appointment of the two Members of 
Parliament on MEPA from the recently appointed Parliamentary Assistants. Although 
one understands that such Assistants should perform parliamentary not government 
business, their close relationship to a Minister – especially if the Minister happens to be 
the Minister responsible for the environment and development planning – makes them 
just as inappropriate for such appointment on the MEPA board as a Member of 
Parliament.15 
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The Constitutional Doctrine of the Separation of Powers and MEPA Membership  
 
When the Development Planning Act was enacted in 1992 it provided that two MEPA 
board members were to be appointed from amongst members of the House of 
Representatives. One such board member is appointed by the Prime Minister and another 
board member by the Leader of the Opposition (see article 3(3) of the DPA). The position 
has not changed between 1992 and 2010; nor will the Bill be proposing any changes in 
this regard (see article 6(4) of the Bill). 
 
The problem with this provision is that it flouts the constitutional doctrine of the 
separation of powers: two Members of Parliament, one from each side of the House, are 
appointed on a public corporation which to a great extent takes orders from the 
Government of the day. The doctrine of separation of powers requires that these two 
members of Parliament should not sit and partake in decision making in another organ of 
the state when these two MEPA board Members of Parliament have already participated 
in the MEPA’s deliberations and decision making. Yet these two MPs, now in their 
parliamentary role, have to take cognizance of MEPA’s annual report, financial 
estimates, audited accounts and other matters concerning MEPA, in the House of 
Representatives and/or in a Committee of the House such as the Public Accounts 
Committee and the Standing Committee on Development Planning. What if one or both 
MPs who sit on the MEPA board end up being members of the PAC or the Standing 
Committee? What is the situation when the whole House is taking cognizance of MEPA 
affairs or matters related thereto such as the approval of Structure Plan amendments? 
Does this not run counter to the doctrine of separation of powers? Members of Parliament 
should thus confine themselves to membership of the House of Representatives and its 
committees and should no longer sit on the MEPA board. 
 
Further Curtailment of MEPA’s Independence 
 
When the MEPA was established in 1992, it was established as an independent authority. 
Nevertheless, as time passed by, MEPA lost its independence becoming more of a 
government department than a public corporation which has final decision making 
powers as to its own affairs. The first onslaught at MEPA’s independence goes back to 
the 1997 amendments introduced by a Labour administration; the second assault was in 
2001 where MEPA lost considerable powers it previously enjoyed under the same 
Nationalist Government which had granted them to it but which now decided to take 
them back; the final attack is the present Bill. For instance, clause 8(5) of the Bill 
provides that “In the execution of its functions under Part III and Part IV of the Act,16 the 
Authority shall consult with the Minister”. This means that MEPA is subject to more 
Government scrutiny, control and interference when exercising its lawful functions. 
Another limitation on MEPA’s independence is found in clause 8(8) which reads as 
follows: “The Authority shall execute its duties, functions and responsibilities in 
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accordance with Government’s policies relating to development and the environment as 
well as such policies relating to the environment as are applicable to Malta.” 
 
This is a strange provision. To which Government policies is reference being made? Why 
is no cross reference being afforded to a provision of the DPA whereby Government is 
authorized to approve policies relating to development and the environment? What if 
such policies run counter to the Structure Plan? Will there not be a conflict between 
clause 69(1)(a) of the Bill and this aforequoted provision?17 Which provision should 
MEPA apply once there are two provisions in the same law requesting MEPA to apply 
different policies, that is, the Structure Plan versus Government policies relating to 
development and the environment? Furthermore, is there any other provision in any other 
law to which reference is being made and, if so, which law? 
 
An analysis of the Bill’s clauses indicates that the Minister’s powers are being extended 
considerably. Each time that the DPA is amended (or re-enacted as in the present case), 
the Minister’s powers keep on increasing drastically to such an extent that it is beginning 
to embarrass Louis XIV and his autocratic style of governance epitomized in his 
infamous expression l’état, c’est moi. Although Government has opted to bark up the 
wrong tree – and who is this humble unassuming professor of law to convince the 
Government not to do so? – the Government should legislate to establish MEPA not as a 
public corporation but as a government agency created under the Public Administration 
Act. Otherwise the distinction between the two organizations (a public corporation and a 
government agency) ends up being blurred from an Administrative Law viewpoint. In 
this way the Government should call a spade a spade rather than giving the impression, 
when it suits it, that the MEPA is an independent and autonomous body from 
Government when it is no longer so. 
 
Appointment of MEPA Chief Executive Officer and Directors to head the four 
MEPA Directorates 
 
The Bill establishes the office of Chief Executive Officer and a number of Directorates. 
The current position is that there is a MEPA Director-General whose office was not 
established by law but on an administrative basis. The office of a chief officer is now 
being established by law and is being correctly re-designated as Chief Executive Officer. 
The term ‘Director-General’ is normally reserved for the public service whilst the words 
‘Chief Executive Officer’ are used in conjunction with a public or private corporation. 
Again, today there are three directorates: Planning, Environment Protection and 
Corporate Services. The Bill is proposing in its Third Schedule that there should be a 
fourth directorate on Enforcement. I fully subscribe to this proposal as one of the main 
problems with MEPA since 1992 has been the lack of an efficient and effective 
enforcement mechanism. 
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On the other hand, I fail to understand why in clause 13(1) the MEPA Chief Executive 
should be appointed “with the approval of the Minister”. Are not the members of the 
MEPA competent enough to deal with this issue? Why does the decision need to be 
endorsed by the Minister? What if the Minister disagrees with the Selection Board’s 
recommendations? Does this not constitute an unwarranted interference is the day-to-day 
running of the corporation? Nor do I see any valid reason why in clause 12(4) it is stated 
that the directors to head each directorate have to be appointed by MEPA “with the 
approval of the Minister”. Unfortunately, MEPA has become too much of a government 
agency rather than a public corporation. The distinction between the two is nearly non-
existent insofar as Ministerial control over MEPA is concerned, and yet MEPA has not 
been established as an agency of the Government under the Public Administration Act.  
 
Internal Audit Functions 
 
In terms of clause 14(3) of the Bill, a MEPA officer will be appointed Internal Auditor. 
This function should not be confused with that of the Audit Officer. In terms of the DPA, 
the latter is neither an Internal Auditor nor an External Auditor. Indeed, under the latter 
enactment, the office of Audit Officer was assigned ombudsman duties and not financial 
auditing. On the other hand, and correctly so, the internal auditor is assigned financial 
auditing duties and not administrative investigations relating to the running of MEPA and 
its decision making processes. It therefore makes a lot of sense if, as stated in clause 
14(4) of the Bill, the Internal Auditor reports “directly and exclusively to the Authority in 
accordance with procedures established by the Authority”.  
 
In addition, there is no reference to the Audit Officer in the Bill. This is because such 
reference is found in Bill No. 48 where the definition of Audit Officer in article 2 of the 
DPA and the provision regulating the Audit Officer in article 17C of the DPA are 
proposed to be repealed. Of course, if the Bill is enacted before the Ombudsman 
(Amendment) Act (Bill No. 48) then one has to ensure that the provisions in the DPA 
referring to the Audit Officer cited above are not repealed unless and until a 
Commissioner for the Environment is appointed under the Ombudsman Act and that the 
complaints pending before the Audit Officer are transferred to the new Commissioner 
taking over the duties of Audit Officer.18 
 
Detailing of Public Officers with MEPA and the Bleak Future of its Employees 
 
Clauses 18 to 20 deal with detailing of public officers with MEPA as well as their 
pension rights. Whilst these provisions made sense in 1992 when the then Planning 
Authority was established, it is standard procedure in Maltese Administrative Law when 
a new public corporation is established, to include provisions regulating the detailing of 
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public officers with the new public corporation, in our case MEPA, where such is the 
case. However, one asks whether these provisions are still relevant today, eighteen years 
after the enactment of the DPA? Are not eighteen years more than sufficient for the 
MEPA and the Management and Personnel Office within the Office of the Prime 
Minister to make up their mind as to whether such detailed public officers should take up 
permanent employment with MEPA in lieu of their public office employment or else be 
reassigned duties in the public service? It would be interesting to know what is the exact 
number of public officers who are still detailed with MEPA, if such still exist, why is this  
the case. It would also be interesting to learn why the Management and Personnel Office 
and the MEPA have allowed such a situation to continue over such a long period of time 
and why have the detailing provisions of the 1992 Act not been implemented fully? If 
there is no reasonable justification for this state of affairs, one would be correct to 
criticize the public administration on the grounds of lethargy in giving full effect to 
Parliament’s will. If there are still public officers detailed with MEPA, a decision as to 
whether they should be recruited with MEPA or else reassigned to perform duties in the 
public service should be taken not later than one year from the enactment of the Bill. 
 
Worse still, what will be the fate of MEPA employees who are not public officers? 
Presumably, today, the bulk of MEPA employees fall in this category. In terms of the Bill 
there is no commitment envisaged on the part of the MEPA established by the Bill to re-
employ the employees of the MEPA established by the DPA. Once the Bill is enacted 
into law and comes into force, the MEPA established under the DPA will die a legal 
death. The new MEPA will then take over but with no obligations regarding the tenure of 
existing MEPA’s employees. When the provision establishing MEPA comes into force, 
MEPA will start from a clean slate, a tabula rasa, once it is not the legal successor of the 
MEPA established by the DPA. Its only servants will be those public officers, if any, 
whom the Prime Minister will detail to work at the MEPA. I would not want to be in the 
situation of MEPA employees on the entry into force of the provision establishing MEPA 
as the law will bring about their ex lege consequential termination of employment. The 
much required transitory provision, if it is Government’s intention to retain MEPA 
employees, is conspicuously absent. In terms of the Bill, a new recruitment process will 
have to embarked upon unless a transitory provision is added to the effect that the MEPA 
established by the Bill will assume all rights and obligations hitherto bestowed upon the 
MEPA established by the DPA and that, for all intents and purposes of law, MEPA 
employees employed in terms of the DPA will be considered to continue to be MEPA 
employees for the purposes of the Bill. 
 
Setting up of the Registration Board 
 
In terms of clause 42, a Registration Board is being set up “to evaluate applications for 
registration in the Register of Consultants eligible to carry out environment assessments 
and other assessments”. The Board was already established by regulation 36 of the 
Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations, 2007 (subsidiary Legislation 356.09). A 
similar provision existed in regulation 36 of the Environment Impact Assessment 
Regulations, 2001 (also Subsidiary Legislation 356.09). This is the third attempt at 
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establishing such a Board by law. Hopefully, this third time round, the Registration Board 
will be appointed and start to function. 
 
Abolition of Certain Committees 
 
The Planning Consultative Committee and the Inter-departmental Planning Committee 
will be abolished. Whilst I see sense in the abolition of the Planning Consultative 
Committee as it, to a certain extent, replicated the functions of the Users’ Committee and 
hence it is a good idea to fuse both committees into one, I do not understand why the 
Inter-departmental Planning Committee has been abolished.  This Committee, in terms of 
article 17D of the DPA was entrusted with the functions of: 
 
(a) monitoring the implementation of the functions conferred upon a department 
of the Government or a body corporate under the DPA or under any development plan or 
planning policy; and 
 
(b) coordinating the workings of the said departments and bodies corporate in 
performing their functions as aforesaid and to advise and assist them. 
 
Perhaps such duties will now be carried out by the Office of the Prime Minister? 
 
 
Development Planning Issues 
 
Part IV of the Bill deals with environment and development planning. Clause 47 refers to 
plans, policies and regulations but, through an oversight, forgets to include in the list 
orders made in terms of clause 63 through which the environment is also managed and 
planned. 
 
Imprecise Drafting: Wrong Cross-Reference 
 
Clause 8(2)(e) contains a wrong cross-reference to clause 8(2)(b) and (c). The correct 
cross reference is clause 8(2)(c) and (d). 
 
Provisions concerning Human Rights Law 
 
On a more positive note, and this has to be commended, are the highly interesting 
provisions in the Bill which bring administrative law within the fold of human rights law. 
I have here in mind the provisions regulating the Environment and Planning Review 
Tribunal (hereinafter ‘the Tribunal’), the new name being given to what has since 1992 
been called the ‘Planning Appeals Board’. 
 
Tribunal’s Funds to be a Charge on the Consolidated Fund 
 
As a quasi-judicial body – like the Rent Regulations Board, the Agricultural Leases 
Control Board, the Administrative Review Tribunal, etc. – the expenses incurred in 
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connection with the operation of the Tribunal should be a charge on the Consolidated 
Fund and not a charge on MEPA (the latter being one of the parties appearing before the 
Tribunal). The Planning Appeals Board (hereinafter ‘the Board’) has been embroiled in 
unnecessary constitutional court litigation - simply because of the provision contained in 
article 15 (8) of the DPA which states that the expenses of the Board (including the 
honorarium payable to the Chairman and Members of the Board) has to be met by 
MEPA. The independence of the PAB has been challenged on this basis in the Kunsill 
Lokali Kirkop (Multigas) case19 and in the Kunsill Lokali Marsaskala (Sant’Antnin 
Recycling plant) case.20 The former case has been decided in favour of the Board but on a 
point of procedure whereby it was declared that the applicant Local Council did not have 
the locus standi under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms to institute proceedings alleging a violation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, and not on the merits. The other case is still awaiting judgment. In 
order to do away with such unnecessary litigation, the Bill is thus correctly proposing to 
substitute the provision now contained in article 15(8) of the DPA by the following in 
clause 40: 
(7) The expenses incurred in connection with the administration of the 
Tribunal, including the payment of the honorarium to the Chairman and 
members of the Tribunal and the salary of the Tribunal’s Secretary and the 
Tribunal’s staff, shall be paid out of the Consolidated Fund without the 
necessity of any further appropriation. 
 
Removal of the Tribunal’s Chairman and Members 
 
As article 14(5) of the DPA currently obtains the Minister responsible for planning may 
remove the Chairman and Members of the Planning Appeals Board. This is however not 
acceptable at law as it must be borne in mind that this Board is not a public corporation 
(like MEPA) or any other administrative board but is a judicial body which decides ‘civil 
rights and obligations’ in terms of Article 6 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and article 39 (3) of the Constitution of Malta. Hence, 
it is an “independent and impartial tribunal established by law” and as such should enjoy 
the relative human rights safeguards entrusted to it by the case law of the Strasbourg 
court. Moreover, the Government has to apply for development permission and it is not 
the first time that the Government (Ministries, departments, agencies, etc.) ends up a 
party before the PAB. The Bill is thus proposing to substitute article 14 (5) of the DPA21 
with a provision in clause 40 whereby the grounds of removal of a member of the Board 
                                                 
19
 Kunsill Lokali Kirkop vs. Avukati Generali et (amongst the respondents were the Chairman and members 
of the Planning Appeals Board) decided by the Civil Court, First Hall, per Mr. Justice Geoffrey Valenzia, 
on 20 October 2008 (application number 4 of 2001). 
20
 Kunsill Lokali Marsascala vs. Avukat Generali et (once again, amongst the respondents were the 
Chairman and members of the Planning Appeals Board). This case is pending before the Civil Court, First 
Hall, Constitutional Competence (Mr. Justice Gino Camilleri, application number 5/2006). 
21
 This provision reads as follows: 
“A member of the Board may be removed from office by the President acting on the advice of the Minister 
on grounds of gross negligence, conflict of interest, incompetence, or acts or omissions unbecoming a 
member of the Board.” 
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are equated to those for the removal of a member of the judiciary. This is a positive 
measure. The new clause reads as follows: 
 
(5) In the exercise of their functions under this Act, the Chairman and the 
members of the Tribunal shall not be subject to the control or direction of any 
other person or authority, and may be removed from office by the President 
acting on the advice of the Minister for the reasons provided in article 97(2) 
of the Constitution.22 
 
Innovations concerning the Law of Procedure 
 
Summoning Witnesses before the Tribunal  
 
The Third Schedule to the DPA empowers the Appeals Board to summon witnesses and 
to administer the oath to any person appearing before it but does not contemplate the case 
where the witness, notwithstanding the fact that s/he is duly notified, does not enter an 
appearance to give evidence before the Board. This problem is now being remedied in the 
Bill. Hence paragraph 4 of the Second Schedule of the Bill provides as follows: 
 
(5) The Tribunal shall have the power to summon witnesses and to administer 
the oath to any person appearing before it. Should a witness duly notified by a 
summons signed by the Chairman of the Tribunal fail to enter an appearance 
before the Tribunal, such person shall be guilty of an offence and liable, on 
conviction, to a fine (multa) of not less than five hundred euro and not more 
than five thousand euro. 
 
The Demise of the Doctrine of Juridical Interest in Planning Appeals 
 
It is necessary to clarify in the law that aggrieved parties (who are appellants) do not need 
to prove that they have an interest in the appeal proceedings in terms of the doctrine of 
juridical interest as applied by the courts of civil jurisdiction to court litigation. What they 
have to submit to the Appeals Board are only the “reasoned grounds based on planning 
considerations”. The Bill thus introduces a new paragraph in the Second Schedule which 
reads as follows: 
 
“When an appeal has been lodged by a person other than the applicant, such 
a person need not prove that he has an interest in that appeal in terms of the 
doctrine of juridical interest which doctrine shall not apply to such 
proceedings, but he shall submit reasoned grounds based on environmental 
and, or (sic) planning considerations to justify his appeal. 
 
This will free the Tribunal from having to deliver a number of time consuming 
preliminary decisions together with having to devote a number of sittings simply to 
establish whether such parties comply with the doctrine of juridical interest. By removing 
                                                 
22
 The said reasons are: “proved inability to perform the functions of his office (whether arising from 
infirmity of body or mind or any other cause) or proved misbehaviour.” 
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this requirement the appeal procedure is expedited. This doctrine is irrelevant for 
proceedings before the Tribunal more so that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction has been 
widened to include environmental appeals. What is relevant for the Tribunal is whether 
the MEPA has applied correctly the law and development plans and planning policies to 
the development permission application in question.  
 
Increased Rights to Interested Third Parties in Appellate Proceedings before the 
Tribunal 
 
Whilst bearing in mind that in terms of article 15(10) read in conjunction with article 
33(1) of the DPA, the PAB has to consider during its deliberations the written 
submissions of registered objectors with MEPA, the law has never been quite clear as to 
the role of interested third parties. Hence this matter requires legislative regulation. 
Paragraph 11 of the Second Schedule of the Bill has settled this legal quandary as 
follows: 
 
11. A registered third party in terms of article 68 (4) of this Act shall be 
informed by the Tribunal that an appeal has been filed and he may request the 
Secretary of the Tribunal to register him as an interested third party in such an 
appeal. Such a person shall have a right to address the Tribunal and may be 
requested by the Authority or Commission to give evidence in the appeal 
proceedings concerning the said appeal. Unless the Tribunal decides 
otherwise, such a person may be present during all sittings of the Tribunal. 
Such a person may not attend site inspections where the Tribunal enters upon 
the property of the appellant if the appellant objects to the presence of such a 
person entering upon his property. Such a person shall have a right to be 
given a copy of the Tribunal’s decision with regard to those appeal 
proceedings for which he has been registered with the Secretary of the 
Tribunal as interested third party. Such a person may not file an appeal from a 
decision of the Tribunal before the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). 
 
To a certain extent, the Boris Arcidiacono et vs. Salvu Schembri et judgment recently 
delivered by the Civil Court, First Hall, takes this approach when it grants a power of 
audience to interested third parties.23 Although the judgment metes out justice it goes 
beyond the strict provisions of the law and in this case the judiciary is legislating rather 
than applying the strictures of the law.24 
 
Tribunal to issue Suspension Orders in Certain Cases 
                                                 
23
 Boris Arcidiacono et vs. Salvu Schembri et, Civil Court, First Hall, per Mr. Justice Joseph Azzopardi, 26 
October 2009, writ of summons number 1825/2001. This judgment is still subject to appeal. 
24
 The landmark development planning law judgment of Austin Attard Montaldo vs. Chairman Planning 
Authority (Court of Appeal, 20 August 1996, appeal no.433/94) is a case in point. In order to apply the 
principles of justice rather than the strictures of the law, the Court of Appeal interpreted the DPA in a way 
which went beyond what the legislator intended. In this respect the judiciary was legislating thereby 
running counter to the doctrine of the separation of powers. The good thing with this judgment, however, is 
that the Legislature codified in the DPA, with certain modifications, what the Court of Appeal had decided 
in this case. 
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In terms of clause 41(3) of the Bill, the Tribunal may issue a warrant of prohibitory 
injunction even if the law does not refer to it by such name. An order to suspend the 
execution of development in terms of the Bill is regulated as follows: 
 
‘In case of a development in an area which falls outside areas designated for 
development as defined in the Structure Plan or in any other plan or in a 
scheduled property grade 1 or 2 or in a property containing archaeological 
remains, or in the case of demolition within Category A Urban Conservation 
Areas which includes demolition of façade or in a Special Area of 
Conservation, at the request of the appellant made concurrently with the 
application for the appeal, through a partial decision, the Tribunal may 
suspend the execution of the development, in whole or in part, as approved by 
the development permit subject of the appeal, under those terms, conditions 
and other measures it may deem fit: 
Provided also that the application is not for a strategic development 
which, in the opinion of the Minister is of strategic significance or of national 
interest, related to any obligation ensuing from a European Union Directive, 
affects national security or affects interests of other governments. 
 
In terms of Clause 41(4), this suspension order is for a maximum period of three months 
and “shall be deemed to have elapsed ipso jure after the lapse of such a period”. 
 
One has to be very wary when drafting such provisions which encroach upon the Court’s 
jurisdiction. 
 
First, there is going to be an overlap between the Civil Court’s jurisdiction to issue a 
warrant of prohibitory injunction and the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to issue a suspension 
order.  
 
Second, as the law is drafted, both procedures may be exercised concurrently and not to 
the exclusion of one another.  
 
Third, the suspension order is for a maximum duration of three months. What happens if 
the Tribunal delivers its decision on the merits of the appeal within the three month 
period but the party cast lodges an appeal to the Court of Appeal and the said Court takes 
a further three months to decide the appeal? During the three month period within which 
the Court is hearing the appeal, there is no suspension order in force as this would have 
elapsed ipso jure. Will not the appellant, who might have won the appeal before the 
Tribunal, remain unprotected until the appellate proceedings before the Civil Court, First 
Hall, come to an end? Should s/he request the Civil Court to issue a warrant of 
prohibitory injunction till the Court of Appeal decides the appeal? What if the Civil Court 
declines such application? Even if the Civil Court were to accede to applicant’s request to 
issue a warrant of prohibitory injunction, will the appellant have to bring the action 
within twenty days in respect of the right stated in the warrant?25 There is case law to the 
                                                 
25
 Article 843(1) of the Code of Organization and Civil Procedure as applied by article 876A of the said 
Code. 
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effect that if there is a constitutional case instituted by an applicant and such applicant 
requests the Civil Court, First Hall, to issue a warrant of prohibitory injunction, then such 
person need not file a fresh action before the Civil Court, First Hall, in terms of article 
843(1) of the Code.26 But will the Court of Appeal be willing to extend this 
jurisprudential doctrine to an appeal lodged before it from a decision of the Tribunal? 
 
Fourth, what is the situation where the Court of Appeal annuls a Tribunal decision 
remitting it back for rehearing? Will the appellant have a second opportunity to request 
the Tribunal to reissue a second suspension order? As the provision is drafted (the request 
for a suspension order has to be made concurrently with the application of appeal before 
the Tribunal) the answer seems to be in the negative unless this is requested concurrently 
with the filing of the application of appeal. But will it cross an appellant’s mind that s/he 
has to make such request to safeguard his/her interests in such an initial stage of the 
proceedings? 
 
Fifth, the proviso to clause 41(3) of the Bill is ill drafted. The Minister is given the 
discretion to select certain types of applications to which it is not possible to issue a 
suspension order in relation thereto. But how will the Tribunal know which appeals 
pending before it are of such a nature? The provision does not provide a procedure to the 
effect that when a request for an issue of a suspension order is filed with the Tribunal, the 
Tribunal’s Secretary is to inform the Minister of such a request and the Minister will 
decide within a certain short prescribed time whether or not the application in question 
“is of strategic significance or of national interest, related to any obligation ensuing from 
a European Union Directive, affects national security or affects interests of other 
governments.” Moreover the terminology used in this proviso is very loaded: what is 
‘national interest’? Is it the interest of the political party in Government? Our Courts over 
time have struggled to define what constitutes ‘public interest’ in expropriation cases. 
Will they have to pass through the same saga to define what is the ‘national interest’, 
‘national security’ and development of a ‘strategic significance’? Furthermore, why is 
reference being made only to a European Union Directive and not to EU Regulations and 
Council Decisions which are also binding instruments in European Union Law? Would 
not the European Union Act instead constitute a more all embracing cross reference to the 
different forms of European Union Law? 
 
Sixth, there is no right to appeal from a suspension order to the Court of Appeal until 
such time that the Tribunal would have reached its final decision on the merits of the 
appeal. This final decision has to be taken within three months from the date of the first 
hearing of the appeal. According to case law it is not possible to appeal from decrees 
delivered by the PAB.27 Furthermore, clause 41(6) of the Bill provides that, an “appeal 
from a partial decision of the Tribunal may only be filed together with an appeal from the 
final decision of the Tribunal.” Hence, an aggrieved party from the Tribunal’s partial 
                                                 
26
 Kunsill Lokali Kirkop vs. Avukat Generali et, Civil Court, First Hall, per Mr. Justice Joseph R. Micallef, 
3 July 2002, writ of summons 311/01. 
27
 Emanuel Morguello v. Chairman, Planning Authority, Court of Appeal, 28 February 1997, appeal no. 
607/94. 
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decision relating to a suspension order has to wait the Tribunal’s final decision before 
having the opportunity to challenge such decision before the Court of Appeal. 
 
Finally, it is to be borne in mind that clause 41(3) of the Bill does not affect article 
55A(3) of the DPA which, in the Bill, will be renumbered as clause 90(3).28 The latter 
provision addresses the MEPA and not a holder of a development permission. So whilst 
article 55A(3) of the DPA prohibits a court of civil jurisdiction from issuing a warrant of 
prohibitory injunction against the MEPA (except in human rights and fundamental 
freedoms cases),29 the suspension order envisaged in clause 41(3) of the Bill will be 
issued against the development permission holder. Of course, should the MEPA itself be 
the applicant for development permission (and there have been such instances in the 
past), no warrant of prohibitory injunction may be issued against it but nonetheless a 
suspension order may be authorised by the Tribunal in the case of a third party appeal 
from a development permission approved in favour of the MEPA. 
 
Other Amendments Regulating Procedure Before the Tribunal 
 
The Second Schedule of the Bill is introducing innovative procedures which are very 
much needed to regulate the proceedings before the Tribunal: 
 
(a) Clarifying that the time-limit within which the Authority is to file its reply to an 
appeal is not peremptory in nature and thus can be extended by the Tribunal up 
until, for instance, the date of the first sitting (primo appuntamento) without the 
Authority’s reply being declared null and void. This new procedure is contained 
in paragraph 1 of the Second Schedule of the Bill. The relevant part reads as 
follows: “The Authority shall file its reply within thirty days of service upon it or 
within such time as established by the Tribunal.” 
 
(b) Although it is possible for the Authority not to take further cognizance of an 
application lodged before it where the applicant no longer entertains an interest 
therein (article 32(7) of the DPA), there is no comparable procedure in the DPA 
so far as the PAB is concerned. In such case, the Board still has to write a 
decision and cannot declare the appeal abandoned. A new provision has thus been 
included in paragraph 13 of the Second Schedule of the Bill which reads as 
follows: “The Tribunal may deem an appeal as abandoned if the appellant shows 
no interest in the appeal submitted by him.” 
 
(c) There are instances where frivolous and vexatious appeals are filed before the 
Planning Appeals Board simply for the appellant to gain time, especially in cases 
of stop and enforcement notices. The need has thus been felt in the past that it 
                                                 
28
 Clause 90(3) of the Bill reads as follows: ‘Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law and saving 
the provisions of article 46 of the Constitution and Article 4 of the European Convention Act (Chapter 319 
of the Laws of Malta), no precautionary act may be issued by any court against the Authority restraining it 
from the exercise of any of the powers conferred upon it by this article.’ 
29
 See Rose Marie Stagno vs. Chairman of the Planning Authority et, Civil Court, First Hall, per Mr, Justice 
Godwin Muscat Azzopardi, 26 May 1994, application number 915/94. 
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should be possible for the Board to impose a fine on the appellant in such cases. 
The Board should declare such proceedings frivolous or vexations and in such 
cases the Board’s decision will be final with no possibility of judicial review or 
appeal before the Court of Appeal. The relevant provision in paragraph 14 of the 
Second Schedule of the Bill caters for this eventuality. It reads as follows: “The 
Tribunal may impose a fine of € 2,500 in such cases were (sic) it declares such 
proceedings frivolous or vexatious and in such cases the Tribunal’s decision shall 
be final without any redress before the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction).” 
The provisions of article 166A of the Code of Organization and Civil Procedure 
(Chapter 12 of the Laws of Malta) will then apply so that the said fine may be 
collected by the Tribunal. 
 
(d) As the Board incurs expenses when holding a site inspection, the Planning 
Appeals (Fees) Regulations (Subsidiary Legislation 356.02) should be updated to 
provide for a fee for site inspections payable by the party requesting such 
inspection. This measure will also ensure that parties will be more careful when 
requesting the holding of a site inspection so that they will no incur additional 
costs once it is they who will foot the bill. Should the Tribunal decide to hold 
such inspection at its own motion, it will be the appellant who will incur the fee. 
This is now rectified in paragraph 15 of the Second Schedule of the Bill which 
reads as follows: “The Tribunal may impose such fees on the party making the 
request as established for the carrying out of site inspections. Should the Tribunal 
decide to hold such inspection at its own motion, it will be the appellant who will 
incur the fee.”30 
 
(e) An appellant should be obliged to file together with the appeal a copy of the 
application form and plans submitted for approval together with all 
documentation which is relevant for the grounds of appeal, including a copy of 
the Authority’s decision appealed from. This is because the Tribunal, as is the 
position today with the Board, does not have access to such information. 
Paragraph 1 of the Second Schedule of the Bill in relevant part reads as follows: 
“The application shall contain the grounds for the appeal and the request of the 
appellant, and, in the case of an appeal from the refusal of a permission or 
licence, it should include a copy of the application form and documents and plans 
submitted for approval together with all documentation which is relevant for the 
grounds of appeal, including a copy of the Authority’s decision appealed from. A 
copy of the appeal and the ancillary documentation shall be communicated to the 
Authority before the appeal is heard.” 
 
(f) The administrative penalty established by law for sanctioning an illegality should 
be increased as it is too low, especially for major projects. The DPA was amended 
to this effect in 2001 but for some unknown reason, the 2001 amending provision 
increasing the administrative penalty from Lm 1,000 to Lm 10,000 was never 
                                                 
30
 A better worded provision could read as follows: ‘The Tribunal may establish such fees to be paid by the 
party making the request for it to hold a site inspection. Should it be the Tribunal that decides ex proprio 
motu to hold a site inspection, the appellant shall pay such fee as the Tribunal may establish.’ 
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brought into force by the Minister responsible for planning. Clause 93(1) of the 
Bill is increasing the said administrative penalty to fifty thousand euro. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Overall the Bill makes positive inroads in upgrading the DPA to today’s present needs. 
Inter alia: 
 
• it brings administrative law more in line with human rights law;  
 
• it merges in a more harmonious manner the DPA with the Environment Protection 
Act;  
 
• it establishes administrative structures which have both environmental and 
development planning functions;  
 
• it reduces time consuming procedures thereby expediting processes and 
proceedings;  
 
• it grants more rights to interested third parties;  
 
• it removes overlap between extant committees; 
 
• it enhances accountability of MEPA’s structures through establishing internal 
audit functions and relocating the Audit Officer within the Ombudsman’s Office 
thereby increasing his independence from MEPA.  
 
The Bill does however have its pitfalls:  
 
• it continues to perpetuate and increase Government’s hold over MEPA thereby 
reducing the little autonomy and independence it still enjoys from Government, 
turning it into a government agency rather than a public corporation;  
 
• it dismantles what hitherto has taken years to build within the Planning 
Directorate by hiving off several of its indispensable functions to other 
government entities foremost amongst which are forward planning functions: 
these are assigned to the Office of the Prime Minister – perhaps the biggest 
mistake which the Bill commits when firing a barrage of incessant onslaughts on 
MEPA’s independence;31  
 
• it removes climate change from amongst the responsibilities of the Environment 
Protection Directorate on the pretext that it is not part of MEPA’s core functions – 
                                                 
31
 Unfortunately with this reform MEPA will be the end loser: it will not only lose its forward planning 
functions, but other functions which have worked well, such as transport planning, minerals and climate 
change.  
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I cannot conceive of an environmental authority which is not tasked with 
addressing what is considered today to be the most serious environmental threat 
facing humanity: climate change. Yet the Government is proposing to dismember 
climate change issues from MEPA’s portfolio.  
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